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ABSTRACT
The most popular form of user authentication on websites is
the use of passwords. When entering a password, it is cru-
cial that the website uses HTTPS (for the entire content).
However, this is often not the case. We propose PassSec -
a Firefox Add-On to support users to detect password fields
on which their password might be endangered. In addition,
PassSec displays a non-blocking warning next to the pass-
word field, once users click into the password field. The user
is provided with possible consequences of entering a pass-
word, recommendations and further information if wanted.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.5.2 [Information Interfaces and Presentation]: User
interfaces—user-centered design; K.6.5 [Management of
Computing and Information Systems]: Security and
Protection
General Terms
Security, Human Factors
Keywords
Usable security, user support, password security, security
interventions
1. INTRODUCTION
The most popular form of user authentication on websites
is the use of passwords. This is mainly due to its convenience
and simplicity. Protecting a user’s password is crucial, espe-
cially because many users tend to reuse the same password
for different services [5]. That is, once a password is, e.g.
eavesdropped, this password could be reused by the eaves-
dropper for other services of the victim.
Ideally, a password should be entered only if the server is
authentic and the website with the password field is using
HTTPS, while all elements of this website are exchanged
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via HTTPS, and the transmission of the password to the
server happens via HTTPS as well. Only in this case the
owner of the password can effectively protect the password
from falling into the wrong hands. However, there are many
exceptions also from well known websites: (1) On some web-
sites neither the main page is encrypted nor the password
is transmitted to the server encrypted, i.e. via HTTPS,
(e.g. http://edition.cnn.com/). In these cases, the pass-
word can be easily eavesdropped on the network. (2) Some
websites do not use HTTPS for the main page with the
password field, but only transmit the entered password via
HTTPS to the receiving server (e.g. http://www.gmx.net/).
One reason for this approach is that it is inefficient to use
HTTPS for sending advertisement. Even if the password is
transmitted to the server encrypted, the website with the
password field is still vulnerable to manipulations and thus
the entered password is at risk. On several websites the
user can enforce to use HTTPS for the main page as well
as for the transmission (e.g. http://www.gmx.net/). (3)
Yet, there are some websites which do not encrypt all re-
sources (e.g. https://hukd.mydealz.de/login or https:
//www.rtl.de/cms/mein-rtl.html). These resources are
referred to as “mixed content”1. There are two types of
mixed content: mixed passive and mixed active content.
Mixed passive content cannot modify the Document Object
Model (DOM) of a website. Thus, mixed passive content
allows an attacker to see or replace, e.g. an image, served
over HTTP with another image. The user’s password it-
self is not endangered. Therefore, mixed passive content is
treated as secure in our context. The Firefox browser warns
from mixed passive content by means of a grey warning tri-
angle (cf. Figure 1). Mixed active content, on the other
hand, can modify the DOM of an HTTPS website. Thus,
an attacker could potentially steal a user’s sensitive data,
e.g. his/her password, even if the password is transmitted
to the server encrypted. As Firefox version 23 and higher
by default blocks mixed active content we do not consider
this case for PassSec and assume that our users use Fire-
fox 23 and higher. The Firefox browser warns from mixed
active content by means of an orange warning triangle (cf.
Figure 1).
Users have to take quite some effort to find out whether
the ideal case is in place or not: i.e. check for a padlock
or whether the URL starts with https://. In addition, case
(1) and (2) cannot be distinguished unless the user checks
the source code of the website. As security is not a user’s
1https://blog.mozilla.org/tanvi/, Accessed: 14th August,
2014
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Figure 1: Mixed passive content (top) and mixed
active content (bottom) in Firefox browser
primary task [6] and many people might not be aware of
these cases, it is likely that they enter passwords on such
websites without being aware of any risk.
Our goal is to support users by means of a Firefox Add-
On – PassSec – which checks, in case a password field is
present, whether the above described suboptimal conditions
(1) and (2) apply (condition (3) is already covered by Fire-
fox 23 and higher) and changes the background color of the
password field to red and adds a yellow warning triangle to
it (cf. Figure 2). In [2] it has already been evaluated that
the combination of a red background and a yellow warning
triangle is well perceived as security warning. In case the
ideal condition applies, PassSec indicates this as well: the
password field gets a green border and a check mark icon
(cf. Figure 2).
Figure 2: Dangerous (l) and secure (r) case
PassSec has further functionalities: It always checks whether
the website is accessible via HTTPS. Furthermore, if a user
focuses the password field, by e.g. clicking on it, PassSec
displays a dialog next to the password field. This dialog in-
cludes the possible consequence of entering a password on
this website, states a recommendation, such as using the
provided option of always opening this website via HTTPS
(if applicable), and the option for further information about
the consequences or providing more details. Note, if the
user does not focus the password field on this website, this
dialog does not show up at all. This way, we ensure not to
unnecessarily disturb the user.
The goal of this poster is to present the dialogs for different
scenarios and discuss their contents.
2. CONTENT OF DIALOGS
This section deals with the content of the scenario specific
warning dialogs. We distinguish different scenarios, e.g. we
distinguish entering a password to log into a website, set-
ting a password when registering on a website, or changing
a password. All these scenarios can happen in situations de-
scribed in (1)-(3) or with the ideal situation (main page uses
HTTPS and password transmission is via HTTPS as well).
We do not distinguish situations (1) and (2) for the warn-
ings, as both endanger the user’s password. Additionally, in
these scenarios the ideal situation could be available, i.e. a
switch to HTTPS. In this case the user is provided with this
option.
All dialogs first display a short version (cf. Figure 3) and
every section of the dialog can be clicked on in order to un-
fold the specific parts (cf. Figure 4). Each dialog consist
of four parts: headline with the problem statement, conse-
quence(s), recommendation, and further information. The
headline is always the same. All dialogs provide two options
(while due to the passive characteristic of the dialog, none of
them needs to be selected in order to continue and enter the
password): “Close warning” and another one depending on
the situation. In case HTTPS is available PassSec provides
the option to switch to the HTTPS website and always open
the respective website via HTTPS: “Always open secured”.
In case HTTPS is not available PassSec provides the option
to trust the respective website, i.e. add an exception so that
the warning will not appear anymore: “Trust this website”.
Recommendable options are highlighted in green and those
that are not recommended in red.
We make use of wordings that are easy to understand,
as abstract as possible, and not technical as recommended
in [1], i.e. we do not use terms like encryption. The con-
sequence part of the dialog is supported with the icon of
a spy. The recommendation part is supported with a light
bulb, which is standing for idea. Finally, the more informa-
tion part is supported with the well-known “i”.
In the following we summarize the contents of the different
warning dialogs:
HTTPS available: Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the short
resp. long dialog of this scenario (either the website does not
use HTTPS and the password is transmitted via HTTPS or
no HTTPS is made use of at all). Here, the user is first
told that his/her password could fall into an unauthorized
person’s hands. The password could be used to access the
user’s personal data. As opening the website with HTTPS is
possible in this scenario, the user is recommended to always
open this website in a secure mode (via HTTPS). We pro-
vide this option with the aid of an “Always open secured”
button. By highlighting this option in green we want to
encourage the user to click on this button. By clicking on
“More Information” the user can obtain more information
on the topic of secure password entering and transmission.
The button “Close warning” only closes the warning. The
next time a user focuses the password field the warning will
reappear.
Figure 3: Short warning: HTTPS is available
HTTPS not available: Figure 5 shows the dialog of this
scenario (either the website does not use HTTPS and the
password is transmitted via HTTPS or no HTTPS is made
use of at all). Here, the user is first told that his/her pass-
word could fall into an unauthorized person’s hands. The
password could be used to access the user’s personal data.
As opening the website with HTTPS is not available in this
scenario, the user is encouraged to use at least different pass-
words for different websites in case he/she wants to enter a
password. By clicking on “Trust this website” the user can
always trust this website, which will result in not showing
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Figure 4: Long warning: HTTPS is available
this warning again, including the red background of the pass-
word field. As we do not encourage to do so, this option is
highlighted in red. By clicking on “More Information” the
user can obtain more information on the topic of reusing
passwords on different websites.
Figure 5: Long warning: HTTPS is not available
3. RELATEDWORK
We report about the most related one: the approach pro-
posed by Maurer et al. [3, 4].
The goal of Maurer et al. is to increase the users’ secu-
rity awareness when entering critical information, such as
passwords or online banking credentials. Thus, every time
a user is about to enter critical information, e.g. focusing a
password field, a corresponding non-blocking dialog appears
next to the corresponding field. The user is informed about
what kind of information he/she is about to submit. Fur-
thermore, the domain of the visited website is displayed and
whether the sensitive information is transmitted encrypted
or not. Users can decide whether to add this website to a
whitelist or not. On white-listed websites the dialog will
not be shown again. A side effect is the detection of phish-
ing attempts: as soon as the user gets this warning, even
if the website was white-listed before, the user should get
suspicious and not enter any data.
Our focus is on password security while not only consider-
ing password entering but also password setting and chang-
ing scenarios. In addition, we distinguish different cases of
HTTPS being in place as well as being possible, i.e. in par-
ticular we provide the option to always use HTTPS if pos-
sible; and we explain the risk and provide recommendations
how to securely proceed.
4. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
We proposed an Add-On – PassSec – which is supposed
to support users to assess how well their password is pro-
tected on a specific website. For different scenarios PassSec
provides possible consequences, corresponding recommen-
dations (e.g. using different passwords) and further infor-
mation if wanted and needed. Using the Add-On has also
potential to increase users’ security awareness on entering
sensitive data securely. As future work we plan to conduct
a field study in order to analyze the user interactions w.r.t.
whether the users follow our recommendations, e.g. opening
a website with HTTPS or changing passwords on insecure
ones.
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